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Recent election surprises and regime changes have left the impression that politics
has become more fast-moving and unstable. While modern politics does seem more
volatile, there is little systematic evidence to support this claim. This paper seeks to
address this gap in knowledge by reporting data over the last seventy years using public
opinion polls and traditional media data from the UK and Germany. These countries
are good cases to study because both have experienced considerable changes in electoral
behaviour and have new political parties during the time period studied. We measure
volatility in public opinion and in media coverage using approaches from information
theory, tracking the change in word-use patterns across over 700,000 articles. Our
preliminary analysis suggests an increase in the number of opinion issues over time
and a growth in lack of predictability of the media series from the 1970s.
INTRODUCTION
The second decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed
multiple electoral shocks, policy surprises, and regime changes,
which appear to have made political life more fast-moving, un-
predictable, and unstable. Political turbulence would seem to
sum up the character of the new politics1; yet there has been no
systematic investigation into the nature of this volatility. This
paper seeks to address this gap in knowledge by first defining
the concept, then arguing that there are good reasons to be-
lieve that “political volatility” has increased in recent years,
and finally proposing two information theoretic approaches to
quantify the level of volatility in the “issue attention” economy.
We evaluate these measures of political volatility by analyzing
public opinion polls and traditional media data from the last
fifty years in the UK and Germany.
DEFINING POLITICAL VOLATILITY
In this section, we define political volatility, as the term is used
in different ways according to the particular discipline that uses
the concept and the domain under study. We need a concept
that comports with how we see complex political systems oper-
ate, and a corresponding way of measuring it that represents the
concept in practice and is capable of being used with a variety
of data sources.
The word volatility is used across the natural sciences in
mainly two ways, describing either that which is light, and ready
to fly or turn into vapour, or that which is likely to change sud-
denly and unexpectedly. In chemistry and physics, volatile com-
pounds are those that evaporate easily, and in computer science
volatile memory is easier to read and write (i.e., to change), but
also erased once a computer is turned off.
In finance, the volatility of a trading price series describes
the degree of its variation over time, by measuring the standard
deviation of its logarithmic returns. In this context, volatility
is a measure of the unpredictability of a market. This form of
volatility is a parameter in the well-known Black-Scholes model
for the dynamics of financial markets, which assumes market
volatility is constant over time2. By comparison, more recent
models take into account that financial assets experience peri-
ods of high and low volatility. That is, during certain periods,
prices might go up and down very quickly, while during other
times they show much less variation3,4. This change in mar-
ket volatility is also named heteroskedasticity (hetero=different,
skedasis=dispersion).
In political science, the notion of volatility is found in the Ped-
ersen index, which measures the net change within an electoral
party system resulting from individual vote transfers between
parties from an election to another5. The Pedersen Index is also
sometimes dis-aggregated into Type A Volatility, which captures
volatility from party entry and exit, and Type B Volatility6,
which measures the volatility among stable parties that con-
test multiple elections. Type A and B Volatility are also known
as replacement volatility and electoral volatility. Behavioural
studies of voter volatility have also studied volatile behavioural
variables, such as unstable party affiliation, openness to alterna-
tives, anti-party attitude, and vote abstention, all of which aim
at measuring how a voter might behave in a volatile or non-
volatile manner7. In spite of a need for care in using the index
so the results are meaningful and comparable, it still remain the
measurement tool of choice for volatility in political behaviour
and by extension to other kinds of behaviour.8
In the context of agenda-setting research, the volatility of
issues in the public agenda has been defined in terms of the
“the shifting salience of the issues that the [American] public
regards as the most important problem facing the country at a
particular moment”9 and measured as the probability that an
issue stays on the agenda at a particular point in time after it is
introduced. This is most closely related to the form of volatility
we study in this paper—hence the issue attention economy—
but rather than investigating the volatility of a particular issue,
we study the volatility of the whole issue agenda over time.
Volatility can be present in multiple ways when considering
issue agendas. On the one hand, the total number of issues being
considered at a single point in time could increase. On the other
hand, the number of issues could remain constant but attention
could shift more quickly from one set of issues to another. In
the policy agendas literature, scholars have focused on the rare
events called ‘policy punctuations’, sudden breaks in an agenda
series, which tend not to be clustered at points in time or in
domains but spread across political systems, policy sectors, time
periods, and institutions.10 The volatility perspective offers a
more global assessment of changes feeding across the system as a
whole, particular as punctuated changes reflect periods when the
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2agenda is stable which is then disrupted rather than describing
a move from stability to instability. Other literature on public
opinion-responsiveness focus on the crowding out of minor issues
from large events, such as the economy, and tend to assume
a cyclical pattern to changes in the diversity of topics on the
agenda.11 Smaller issues can get onto the agenda once big crises
have retreated and public opinion is less concerned with one
single issue.
QUANTIFYING POLITICAL VOLATILITY
We propose two quantitative measures of political volatility
drawing from information theory. We measure the number of is-
sues receiving attention simultaneously using the effective num-
ber of issues (Nt defined in Equation 2), which is two to the
power of the entropy of the distribution of attention to a set of
issues X (Equation 1). This quantity can be measured at any
point in time t.
Ht(X) = −
n∑
i=1
pt(xi) log2 pt(xi) (1)
Nt(X) = 2
Ht(X) (2)
The intuition behind the effective number of issues is the same
for Laakso and Taagepera’s effective number of parties, which
is a measure of the fractionalization of a party system12. It is
a measure of the diversity of an issue agenda at a given point
in time, and has the same functional form as diversity indices
used in ecology or information theory13.
In their original publication, Laakso and Taagepera com-
pare N as defined in Equation 2 to the inverse Simpson in-
dex, defined as NS = 1/
∑n
i=1 p
2
i , and argue that while they
show the same qualitative features, the former definition is
connected to the physical and information-theoretic concept of
entropy12. Entropy has also been used as a measurement of
policy agenda diversity11,14, sometimes alongside measures of
electoral volatility15, which makes Equation 2 a logical measure
of the number of substantive issues being considered simultane-
ously by policy makers, the media, or the public.
As defined in Equation 2, the effective number of issues ranges
from 1, when all attention is given to a single issue, to n, where
public attention is distributed uniformly across all issues. How-
ever, one would expect the latter scenario to be unlikely, given
the limits on our capacity for processing information—the fa-
mous magical number of seven plus or minus two.16 For these
reasons, we might expect that five to nine issues to receive al-
most all of the attention at any single point in time.
Since it only provides a snapshot of an issue agenda at a
given point in time, the effective number of issues does not mea-
sure how attention to different issues changes over time. There
are other measures more appropriate for this purpose, including
the issue survival rate used by McCombs and Zhu,9 as well as
the measures of voter churn based on the Pedersen Index.5 In
the interest of defining a measure consistent with the entropy-
based effective number of issues presented in Equation, 2 we
define an information-theoretic measure for volatility, namely
the Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence17 between the distribu-
tion of attention over issues between a given point in time t,
denoted pt, and the distribution of attention at a previous time
point denoted pt−1 (Equation 3). It is possible to speak of the
KL Divergence of a policy agenda between a pair of weeks, or
between a pair of years.
DKL(pt|pt−1) =
n∑
i=1
pt(xi) log2
(
pt(xi)
pt−1(xi)
)
(3)
KL Divergence, also known as relative entropy, is an
information-theoretic measurement of surprise, novelty, or in-
formation gain: it is a measure of how one probability distribu-
tion diverges from a second, expected probability distribution.
Apart from its many uses in physics and machine learning, KL
Divergence has also been used to measure cognitive surprise18
and changes in exploration/exploitation behaviour.19 It has also
been used to study agenda diversity in social media, by mea-
suring the divergence between different tweets produced by the
same Twitter users.20 When comparing past and present dis-
tributions of semantic content, KL Divergence has been called
novelty.21 We use KL Divergence in a similar manner as the nov-
elty between the distribution of attention to issues at different
time steps to measure of volatility in the policy agenda.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We selected two country cases of the UK and Germany to ana-
lyze and compare in this study. They meet three different kinds
of selection criteria. The first is different kinds of democratic
country cases from which to observe occasions of volatility and
interconnections between different venues. The argument about
turbulence is one that applies to advanced democracies with
their greater use of media and internet, and pressure on policy
systems. The two countries are however different. The UK po-
litical system with its absence of veto players and centralized
political system has been associated with receptivity to policy
innovations and also liability to policy disasters,22,23 though the
empirical record for these differences is less clear.24. Germany
has experienced relative stability since 1945 through coalition
government, has a complex system of decentralization and inter-
governmental relations, and usually experiences an incremental
pattern of policy-making25. The second criterion is venues from
which to observe changes over time. We selected public opin-
ion polls and traditional media data—two arenas that show less
friction so may be subject to volatility but also can be measured
over a long period of time. The expectation is that print media
will be very responsive to the general pattern of turbulence. We
also look at public opinion, partly because we can compare the
two countries over a long period of time, and because public
opinion shifts are likely to be the transmission mechanism for
volatility. The final selection criteria is the period of time, in or-
der to have enough decades to encompass the changes in recent
years and to allow for other periods of changes to be accounted
for in the analysis.
Public opinion polls
We start with analysis of the data from attitudinal surveys
in Germany and the UK, which ask nationally representative
samples of the German and British populations what they feel
3FIG. 1. Total and effective number of issues in UK and Germany public opinion polls. The top panels show the growth of (a)
the number of issues with non-zero attention by year for the British public opinion survey data, versus (b) the effective number of issues in
the responses to the polls. Panels (c) and (d) respectively show the same numbers for the German opinion polls.
is the most important issue facing their countries on the day.
Data are collected every month in the UK by Ipsos MORI, and
every three months by the German Longitudinal Election Study
(GLES), and the responses are coded into different issue cate-
gories. A heatmap showing public attention to different issues
by month from 1985 to 2016 in the UK is shown in Figure 5.
To examine shifts in public attention, we computed the num-
ber of issues coded each month as well as the distribution of
attention to these issues. Figure 1 shows the total and effective
number of issues in British and German public opinion polls.
Panels 1a and 1c respectively show the number of issues men-
tioned every year in the British public opinion survey data and
every quarter in the German opinion survey data. Panels 1b
and 1d show the effective number of issues present in the survey
data, for the UK and Germany respectively, calculated follow-
ing Equation2. For the UK polls dataset, the top 20 issues were
considered, and issues that were introduced in the UK polls af-
ter 1990 and in the Germany polls after 2012 were removed from
the analysis. Both datasets show a steady total number of is-
sues over time, staying the same after 1990 for the British polls,
and staying between 15 and 16 issues for all German polls after
2011. This stasis, however, is not seen in the effective number of
issues: for the UK polls, shown in Figure 1b, the effective num-
ber of issues grows slowly and is marked by oscillations around a
mean that seems to move slowly from around 9 issues in 1993 to
11 or 12 issues in 2015. The German polls, shown in Figure 1d,
also seem to show a slow growth from around 9 issues in 2010 to
around 12 issues in 2014, followed by a steep decrease in 2015.
This is due to the issue of migration and integration becoming
a dominant issue, as can be seen in Figure 6 in the Appendix.
While the effective number of issues in the public opinion polls
shows clear signs of growth over the years for both countries,
the month-to-month novelty (for the UK polls) and quarter-
to-quarter novelty (for the Germany polls) does not show any
significant trend over time. Figure 2a showing the novelty in
the British opinion polls stays mostly constant over the period
of study. The introduction of new issues between 1985 and
1990 produces a series of peaks in the plot, as new issues are
evidently a great source of novelty in the issue agenda. The
plot also shows a pair of peaks, one after 1990 and one after
2000, occurring shortly after the IRA attacks in 1990-91 in the
UK and after the September 11 attacks in 2001, in the United
States. Since those periods correspond to a sharp increase in
the Defence/Terrorism issue (see Figure 5), it is reasonable to
attribute these peaks in novelty to the sudden relevance of this
issue in the UK policy agenda.
In contrast to the peaks corresponding to terrorist attacks,
the 2008 economic crisis shows as a small bump in the time
series shown in Figure 2)a, representing an increase in novelty,
but one much smaller than the ones in 1990-91 and 2001. This
is explained by the fact that the growth of the Economy issue
in the policy agenda is gradual, taking a year to go from an
issue of medium importance in the end of 2007 to the most
importance in the beginning of 2009. This represents a relatively
slow growth in importance, in comparison to the sudden jumps
in issue relevance caused by terrorist attacks. After the bump in
4novelty during the economic crisis of 2008, the novelty in the UK
polls does not show any meaningful trend. This also applies to
the 2011-2018 interval shown in Figure 2b for the German polls.
News media
To study the variation in the issues covered in the German
and British media, we looked at the patterns of language use
over time, which can be uncovered by topic modelling. Topic
models feature among the most widely used tools in large-scale
text analysis, and can be used to estimate the semantic content
of large collections of documents. For example, topic modelling
has been used to analyze congress speeches26–28.
We used latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA)29 topic modelling,
which assigns every article to a weighted combination of “top-
ics,” i.e., co-occurring word patterns; these topics typically re-
late to issues in the policy agenda with words related to issues
such as the national economy, unemployment, or war featuring
heavily in the topics.30 The LDA method allows for a variable
number of topics, representing the level of coarse-graining of the
text data. We present results using 50 topics. After stopword
removal, the text in every article is converted into a distribution
over topics (issues), after which it becomes possible to measures
effective number of issues and the change in attention between
issues using the approaches described above.
Figure 3 shows the effective number of issues measured for
the two sources of news media used in this paper, namely the
UK-based daily newspaper The Guardian and the Germany-
based weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. Both news vehicles
show a varying effective number of issues over time. For the
Guardian, shown in Figure 3a from 2013 to 2018, the effective
number of issues grows from 2013 to 2015, holding a stable value
from 2015 onwards. Der Spiegel, shown in Figure 3b, shows
wide variation in the first decade after its foundation in 2917,
followed by a growth in the effective number of issues covered
in the news magazine from 1955 to the mid-nineties. There is a
show downturn after that, followed by a sharp decline in the first
half of 2010. This non-monotonic dynamics might be associated
with many sources – the reunification of Germany in 1990, the
launch of Spiegel Online in 1994, or even the introduction of a
new regional supplement in Switzerland in 2007. Whether this
drastic change in the effective number of issues in Der Spiegel
was due to any of the above events or whether it was due to other
newspaper internal policies of the newspaper is still unclear.
As for their levels of novelty, again The Guardian and Der
Spiegel show different behaviour. As shown in Figure 4a, the
month-to-month novelty in the The Guardian is kept constant
from 2013 to 2018. For Der Spiegel, shown in Figure 4b, the
month-to-month novelty shows a slow increase, which is sharper
in the 1960-1970 decade. Der Spiegel also shows a jump in nov-
elty in early 2010, around the same time as the sudden decrease
in the effective number of issues shown in Figure 3b. Once
again, further research is required to evaluate what caused the
patterns observed for both newspapers.
DISCUSSION
So far this paper has shown that volatility can be thought
about consistently in measurement terms and that —from a
FIG. 2. Time series plots showing the novelty (KL Divergence)
measured for the distribution of attention to different issues over
time, (a) in the British monthly public opinion survey data, and (b)
in the German quarterly public opinion survey data. Higher values
indicate sudden shifts in the public attention to policy issues, as well
as the introduction of new issues to the policy agenda between 1985
and 1990.
record of two countries and two data series— there is some ev-
idence to suggest the volatility has increased in recent decades.
Of course, it is possible to say that this is consistent with an
intuitive assessment of recent events that was recounted at the
start of this paper, but it is important to ground this claim in
theories of comparative politics and political behaviour to of-
fer reasons to expect increased volatility, including less voter
loyalty, the diversification of issues, and the rise of new com-
munication technologies such as social media. It is important
to know our results are theoretically what we expect. Indeed,
our empirical results reveal a much more nuanced picture than
a simple incursion of the new disruptive politics would imply.
Researchers on political culture and behaviour identify sys-
tem level changes in advanced democracies pointing to less at-
tachment and voter loyalty to the political system which might
suggest large changes, but over very long term. The key idea is
that rather than voters being aligned to the party system and
then periodically realigned to a new party system, voters are
less aligned overall and more likely to switch parties.31 From
the 1970s observers claims that voters were de-aligned, not hav-
ing such clear homes in parties that represent them for long
periods.32 Such instability can feed into the party system and
then into politics more generally. When linked to other trends
that indicate citizen disengagement from politics, such as de-
clining trust in government and disaffection.33 The rise of anti-
5FIG. 3. Total and effective number of issues in UK and
Germany media. The two plots show the growth of the effective
number of issues, (a) for the British newspaper The Guardian, and
(b) for the German news magazine Der Spiegel.
politics feeds on this lack of trust and also implies that citizens
can move strongly between activism and support for new po-
litical parties but then return to apathy quite quickly.34,35 It
is easy to see the connection to the current period, with new
politicians taking advantage of citizen detachment and lack of
political trust in conventional party politics to put forward their
agendas and to disrupt existing routines.
Another trend toward instability is the diversification of is-
sues and the differentiated of interest representation, as policies
become more complex and interdependent. It is an argument
that reaches back into the 1960s about the diversification of
interests, with the idea that the state has increased pressures
upon it, associated with the expansion of issues beyond eco-
nomic divides.36 This was picked up in the literature on interest
groups in the 1970s which assumed there was a lot of pressure
on policy-making system, the executive establishment, and a
fragmentation of institutions that had previously ensured a lot
of stability for the political system,37 and had created a diverse
set of policy networks.38 Even though notions of instability are
party of the interest group fragmentation, at the time at least,
such ideas were thought to account of government overload and
gridlock rather a government being moved back and forth across
different issues.39,40 The assumption of instability and interest
group diversity was picked up by students of public policy and
agenda setting, who were keen to show the limits to the stasis
and gridlock arguments.41 In any case, the assumption of these
arguments is that changes in the 1960s and 1970s were crucial
to understanding new kinds of politics.
Social media and other recent changes communication tech-
nologies might also increase volatility. These technologies repre-
sent a sudden change in the way in which people communicate
FIG. 4. Time series plots showing the novelty (KL Divergence)
measured for the distribution of attention to different issues over time,
(a) in the British newspaper The Guardian, (b) in the German news
magazine Der Spiegel. Higher values indicate more sudden shifts in
the attention dedicated to policy issues in news media.
and share information, allowing for feedback and interaction in
real time. Even though more traditional forms of communica-
tion through print and broadcast media continue to exist, they
work in parallel with social media, often with media profession-
als participating and reacting to social media content. Social
media exert social influence on users by showing in real time
what other people are doing (social information)42, reducing the
costs of becoming visible and so increasing the likelihood of act-
ing. Individual acts of participation in turn creates further social
information, which may influence someone elses decision about
whether to act, leading to feedback cycles and chain reactions.1
These feedback influences at work on social media platforms
have been shown to introduce instability into cultural markets,
and could now penetrate the “issue attention” economy and
the policy-making landscape, creating political turbulence. This
disorganized environment, in which fluid and overlapping groups
of individuals mobilize around common (often temporary) social
issues and goals, manifests itself, for example, in a highly un-
equal distribution of participants. Most YouTube or Facebook
videos have very few views while a small number are watched
millions of times having accumulated these views quickly and
dramatically. This changes have been quite recent, happening
in the mid-2000s, which is just before the turbulence of the last
decade. Future work might measure volatility in issue attention
across many locations and compare changes in volatility with
social media adoption rates.
6FIG. 5. A heatmap showing the public attention to policy issues by month from 1985 to 2016 as reported by representative surveys of the UK
population collected by Ipsos MORI. Brighter shades of red indicate that a large fraction of the population pointed issues as unemployment
and the National Health Service as important. Grey areas indicate issues which were not included during a specific survey, and black and
grey boxes indicate specific events at the time of an increase in the attention to specific issues.
This literature indicates that political systems are experienc-
ing greater volatility since the 1970s, but our study provides the
first empirical investigation as to how volatility has changed.
Larger-scale research would be needed to work out whether the
changes are associated with these specific processes and their
causal order.
Alternative approaches could consider data on other aspects
of politics and analyze the extent to which volatility affects other
aspects of politics, from voting, media content, speech data and
policy outputs. We restricted our study, as a preliminary anal-
ysis, to two countries and two data sources.
CONCLUSIONS
We leave an open question as to what level of volatility is de-
sirable in politics. In general, politics is characterized by a de-
gree of stability and regularity in its inputs and outputs, such as
habitual voting behaviour over decades, regular concerns about
public issues, a stream of stories in the media, and in repeated
policy outputs, such as laws and budgets. Such stable processes,
in the view of an earlier generation of political scientists, acted
as a bedrock to democratic systems and stopped them from tip-
ping over into extremism.43
But, as Huckfeldt shows theoretically, some short-term insta-
bility is the product of even stable preferences and networks.44Of
course some fluctuation is to be expected in any system as no
democracy is stable but responds to changes in perceptions and
behaviours in reaction to events and real world changes, and is
based on interaction between participants. Absolute stability
is neither to be expected nor even desirable in democracies, as
rapid change may act as a safety valve in processing issues and
responding to citizens.
In one formulation, too much stability can lead to over-large
fluctuations in the agenda down the line, the friction associ-
ated with policy monopolies whose rigidity give way to policy
punctuations.41 Change might be expected from the course of
events and actions, such as economic decisions taken elsewhere,
or errors in policy implementation. Such events may catch the
attention of policy-makers, experts, media professionals, and the
public, or at least some of these actors, who may shift atten-
tion from other issues to attend to them, as they are problems
needing discussion and action. Then having been addressed (or
ignored) other issues appear to draw the attention of the public
and other actors, so the agenda moves in cycles of issues, which
is a standard insight of the agenda-setting literature.45,46
It is the foundation of classic pluralism, where the political
system is seen as in equilibrium with changing forces and inter-
ests at society at large.47 Even the presence of punctuations is
not clustered in certain sectors or periods, emerging from en-
dogenous pressures in policy-systems rather than showing peri-
ods of volatility.10 Care needs to made when attributing equilib-
rium to political systems, whether functionalist or from repeated
games. There is an argument to be made that political systems
have always been liable to chaos and rapid change, which come
from random choices and conjunctions.48.
The evidence in this paper shows that there is some grounds
for thinking that volatility has increased in recent decades,
though the extent and patterning of this changes in the two
countries we have researched does not show the large break
that a reading of the crises of contemporary politics would indi-
cate, with the election surprises, new leaders changes and game-
changing events, such as Brexit. Even with the decrease in the
effective number of issues seen in the post-2015 German public
opinion polls, both countries show numbers higher than Miller’s
seven plus or minus two.
Of course, the rapid change hypothesis is is a too simple a
reading of contemporary politics, and the trends we have un-
covered suggest a more complex and differentiated pattern, with
some changes reaching back to the 1970s, which is more consis-
7tent with the literature in political behaviour, interest groups
and public policy, which refers to voter disengagement, issue
complexity and differentiation of policy challenges. This paper
then sets the agenda for a future research programme that can
ascertain the extent and variation in political volatility in polit-
ical attention and attribute its causes in comparative contexts.
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9FIG. 6. The proportion of the attention dedicated to different most important issues (MIIs) in the German opinion polls plotted over time,
with different colours indicating the ten most important issues from the survey.
